This paper studies the relationship between unpredictable functions (which formalize the concept of a MAC) and pseudo-random functions. We show an e cient transformation of the former to the latter using a unique application of the Goldreich-Levin hard-core bit (taking the inner-product with a random vector r): While in most applications of the GL-bit the random vector r may be public, in our setting this is not the case. The transformation is only secure when r is secret and treated as part of the key. In addition, we consider weaker notions of unpredictability and their relationship to the corresponding notions of pseudorandomness. In particular, this gives a simple construction of a private-key encryption scheme from the standard challenge-response identi cation scheme.
Introduction
This paper studies several ways to weaken the de nition of pseudo-random functions that come up naturally in applications such as authentication and identi cation. We focus on the concept of an unpredictable function and its relationship to a pseudo-random function. We also consider the notion of a random attack vs. an adaptive attack. We show that in several settings unpredictability can easily be turned into pseudo-randomness.
Pseudo-random functions were introduced by Goldreich, Goldwasser and Micali 13] and are a very well studied object in Foundations of Cryptography. A distribution of functions is pseudo-random if: (1) This distribution is e cient (i.e., it is easy to sample functions according to the distribution and to compute their value). (2) It is hard to tell apart a function sampled according to this distribution from a uniformly distributed function given an adaptive access to the function as a black-box.
Pseudo-random functions have numerous applications in practically any scenario where a large amount of randomness need to be shared or xed (see e.g., 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 17, 18, 20] ). In this paper we concentrate on the application to authentication (and also on the applications to identi cation and encryption): A pseudo-random function f s can be used as a MAC (message authentication code) by letting the authentication tag of a message m be f s (m) (where the key, s, of f s is also the private key of the MAC).
As discussed by Bellare, Canetti and Krawczyk 1] (see also 22]) the security of this scheme does not require the full strength of a pseudo-random function. Breaking this MAC (under the strong attack of existential forgery with chosen message) amounts to adaptively querying f s on chosen messages m 1 ; m 2 ; : : :m q 1 and then computing a pair hm; f s (m)i for which m is di erent from m 1 ; m 2 ; : : :m q 1 . As will be argued below, this might be hard even if f s is not pseudo-random. Such a requirement is formalized by the concept of unpredictable functions:
A distribution of functions is unpredictable if: (1) This distribution is e cient. (2) For any e cient adversary that is given an adaptive black-box access to a function (sampled according to this distribution) it is hard to compute the value of the function at any point that was not queried explicitly.
Note that from this de nition it follows that the range of an unpredictable function f s must be large. The de nition can be naturally extended to allow f s with a range of arbitrary size N by requiring that the advantage of computing f s (x) (for any unqueried x) over the 1=N probability of a successful guess be negligible. However, in case N is small this de nition implies that f s is pseudo-random. As an interesting analogy, consider Shamir's \unpredictable" number sequences 24]. There, given any pre x of the sequence it is hard to compute the next number. As shown by Yao 26] , the unpredictability of the bit sequences introduced by Blum and Micali 7] , implies their pseudo-randomness. Thus unpredictability and pseudo-randomness are equivalent for bit sequences.
Between Pseudo-Random Functions and Unpredictable Functions
Since for a random function with large enough range it is impossible to guess its value at any unqueried point, we have that a pseudo-random function with large enough range is unpredictable. Otherwise, the prediction algorithm can be used as a distinguisher. However, an unpredictable function need not \hide" anything about the input, and in particular may reveal the input. For instance, if g s is a pseudo-random function, then the function hx; g s (x)i (x concatenated with g s (x)) is an unpredictable function that completely reveals the input.
Using unpredictable functions instead of pseudo-random functions may lead to better e ciency. For example, Bellare, Canetti and Krawczyk 1] suggest that modeling cryptographic hash functions such as MD5 and SHA as being unpredictable is a realistic assumption. Nevertheless, pseudo-random functions are still valuable for many applications such as private-key encryption. In fact, pseudo-random functions are useful even in the context of authentication. Consider Wegman-Carter 25] based MACs. I.e., letting the authentication tag of a message m be f s (h(m)) where h is a non-cryptographic hash-function (e.g., almostuniversal 2 ). Such MACs are a serious competitors to both CBC-MACs 3] and HMACs 1]. They are especially attractive for long messages since the cryptographic function is only applied to a much shorter string and since for some of the recent constructions of hash functions (e.g., 16, 23] ) computing h(m) is relatively cheap. However, in this case it is not enough for f s to be unpredictable but it should also hide information about its input.
An obvious question at this point is whether it is possible to use unpredictable functions in order to construct a full-edged pseudo-random function at low cost. A natural construction is to apply the Goldreich-Levin hard-core bit 15] (GL-bit) in order to obtain a single-bit pseudo-random function using the inner-product with a random (but xed) vector r. In other words, if f : f0; 1g n 7 ! f0; 1g m is an unpredictable function, then consider g : f0; 1g n 7 ! f0; 1g where g(x) = f(x) r (and denotes the inner product mod 2).
However, it turns out that the security of this construction is more delicate than may seem:
If r 2 f0; 1g m is public, the result might not be pseudo-random. If r 2 f0; 1g m is kept secret (part of the key), the result is a single-bit pseudo-random function. We nd this result surprising since, as far as we are aware, this is the only application of the GL-bit that requires r to be secret.
One obvious disadvantage of this transformation is that we get a single-bit pseudorandom function. However, one can extract more than a single bit at the cost of decreasing the security of the functions (by using the GL hard-core functions). Extracting`bits results in a factor 2`decrease. In case the unpredictable function is very secure, such a reduction might still be tolerable. An alternative solution is to concatenate several pseudo-random functions. Moreover, there are several scenarios where a single-bit (or few-bit) pseudorandom function is needed (see e.g., 27] which also motivated this work). This is the case where many functions are used for authentication but the adversary knows a constant fraction of them so there is no point in having functions with large range.
Consequences
One application of the transformation from unpredictability to indistinguishability is for using e cient constructions of MACs in scenarios that require pseudo-random functions. As described above, this is especially true when a single-bit pseudo-random function is needed (e.g., 27] ). An interesting question raised by our work is how valid is the distinction made by export regulations between MACs and encryption schemes. In fact, as shown by this paper, even functions that are designed for the standard challenge-response identi cation scheme can be used for encryption.
Random Attacks
Motivated by the requirements of standard protocols for identi cation and encryption, we consider two additional relaxations of unpredictable functions. The rst is requiring that no e cient algorithm after adaptively querying the function can compute its value on a random challenge instead of any new point of its choice. The second relaxation is achieved by giving the adversary the output of the function on (polynomial number) of random inputs (instead of allowing it an adaptive attack). In addition, we consider the equivalent notions of indistinguishability. We use these concepts for:
Identifying the exact requirements of standard schemes for authentication, identi cation and encryption.
Showing that in the case of a random challenge, the transformation from unpredictability to indistinguishability is still secure even if the vector r is public. This transformation provide a simple construction of a private-key encryption scheme from the standard challenge-response identi cation scheme. Showing a more e cient variant for one of the constructions in 21] that achieves some notion of unpredictability (which is su cient for the standard identi cation scheme). Random attacks on function-ensembles are also natural in the context of Computational Learning-Theory 5]. In addition, it was shown in 19] how to construct a \regular" pseudo-random function f from such a weak pseudo-random functions h (going through the concept of a pseudo-random synthesizer). Given that h has a large enough output and that f is de ned on k-bit inputs, computing f involves O(k= log k) invocations of h. The construction of this paper completes the transformation of weak unpredictable functions to regular pseudo-random functions.
Organization
In Section 3 we de ne unpredictable functions. In Section 4 we de ne the transformation from unpredictable functions to pseudo-random functions and show that it requires the vector r to be secret. In Section 5 we consider weaker notions of unpredictability and pseudo-randomness.
Preliminaries
In this section we include the de nition function-ensembles and pseudo-random functions almost as they appear in 12, 20]:
2.1 Notation I n denotes the set of all n-bit strings, f0; 1g n . U n denotes the random variable uniformly distributed over I n . Let x and y be two bit strings of equal length, then x y denotes their bit-by-bit exclusive-or. Let x and y be two bit strings of equal length, then x y denotes their inner product mod 2.
Function-Ensembles and Pseudo-Random Function Ensembles
Let fA n ; B n g n2N be a sequence of domains. A A n 7 ! B n function ensemble is a sequence F = fF n g n2N such that F n is a distribution over the set of A n 7 ! B n functions. R = fR n g n2N is the uniform A n 7 ! B n function ensemble if R n is uniformly distributed over the set of A n 7 ! B n functions.
A function ensemble, F = fF n g n2N , is e ciently computable if the distribution F n can be sampled e ciently and the functions in F n can be computed e ciently. More formally, if there exist probabilistic polynomial-time Turing-machines, I and V, and a mapping from strings to functions, , such that (I(1 n )) and F n are identically distributed and V(i; x) = ( (i))(x) (i.e. F n V(I(1 n ); )). De nition 2.2 (pseudo-random function) . Let fA n ; B n g n2N be a sequence of domains. Let F = fF n g n2N be an e ciently computable A n 7 ! B n function ensemble and let R = fR n g n2N be the uniform A n 7 ! B n function ensemble. F is pseudo-random if for every e cient oracle-machine M,
De nition 2.1 (negligible functions)
is negligible.
Remark 2.1 In these de nitions, as well as in the other de nitions of this paper, \e cient" is interpreted as \probabilistic polynomial-time" and \negligible" is interpreted as \smaller than 1=poly". In fact, all the proofs in this paper easily imply more quantitative results. For a discussion on security preserving reductions see 17].
Unpredictable Functions
In this section we de ne unpredictable functions. As described in the introduction, the motivation of this de nition is the security of MACs. As an additional motivation, let us rst consider an equivalent de nition of pseudo-random functions through an interactive protocol. This de nition will also be used in Section 5 as a basis for the de nition of other weaker notions. For simplicity, we only consider I n 7 ! I`( n) function-ensembles, where`is some N 7 ! N function.
De nition 3.1 (indistinguishability against an adaptive sample and an adaptive challenge) Let F = fF n g n2N be an e cient I n 7 ! I`( n) function-ensemble and let c 2 N be some constant. We de ne an interactive protocol that involves two parties, D and V:
On the common input 1 n , the private input of V is a key s of a function f s sampled from F n and a uniformly distributed bit . The protocol is carried out in q = n c rounds. De nition 3.2 (unpredictable functions) Let F = fF n g n2N be an e cient I n 7 ! I`( n) function-ensemble and let c 2 N be some constant. We de ne an interactive protocol that involves two parties, D and V:
On the common input 1 n , the private input of V is a key s of a function f s sampled from F n . The protocol is carried out in q 1 rounds for q = n c . At the i th round of the protocol, D sends to V a point x i 2 I n and in return V sends to D the value f s (x i ). At the termination of the protocol, D outputs a point x q which is di erent from x 1 ; x 2 ; : : :x q 1 and a string y which is its guess for f s (x q ). is negligible. The expression \F is an unpredictable function ensemble" is used as an abbreviation for \F obtains unpredictability against an adaptive sample and an adaptive challenge".
Turning Unpredictability into Indistinguishability
In this section we show how to apply the GL hard-core bit 15] in order to construct pseudorandom functions from unpredictable-functions. At rst thought, one would imagine that such an application is straightforward as is the case with key-exchange protocols. However, as demonstrated below, this is not the case in our scenario.
Goldreich and Levin have shown that for every one-way function, g, given g(x) (for a random input x) and given a random vector r it is infeasible to guess r x with nonnegligible advantage over 1=2. In fact, their result apply in a more general context: If given g(x) it is hard to compute f(x), then given g(x) and r it is also hard to guess f(x) r.
Since the GL-bit transforms hardness of computation into indistinguishability it is natural to apply it in our context: Given an unpredictable function f : I n 7 ! I m a natural candidate for a pseudo-random function is g s;r (x) = f s (x) r, where r is a random vector. Indeed, it is rather straightforward that for any unqueried input x it is hard to guess f s (x) r for a random vector r chosen after x is xed. However, this is not su cient for proving that g s;r is pseudo-random: The distinguisher gets g s;r (x) on inputs x of its choice. Since this choice might depend on r it might be easy to guess f s (x) r and to distinguish g s;r from random. As shown by the following example, this is exactly the case when the random string r is public:
The Counter-Example If at least n bits of x are zeroes, let i 1 ; i 2 ; : : :; i n be the rst locations of such bits. Then for every 1 j n the bit y i j equals the j th bit of h s (x) and for any other location i the bit y i is set to zero. If at least 2n bits of x are ones, let i 1 ; i 2 ; : : :; i 2n be the rst locations of such bits. Then for every 1 j n the bits y i j and y i j+n equal to the j th bit of h s (x) and for any other location i the bit y i is set to zero. The function f s (x) is unpredictable, since h s (x) is unpredictable and it can be derived from hx; f s (x)i. However, for every r 2 I 3n and every s we have that f s (r) r = 0. Therefore, when r is public, the function g s;r can easily be distinguished from random. The distinguisher simply outputs g s;r (r).
A Secret r Works
As shown by the example above, the f s (x) r construction does not work in case r is public. We now show that this construction does work when r is secret. This fact is rather surprising since, as far as we are aware of, there is no other application of the GL-bit that requires r to be kept a secret. Construction 4.1 Let F = fF n g n2N be an e cient I n 7 ! I`( n) function-ensemble. We de ne an e cient I n 7 ! I 1 function-ensemble G = fG n g n2N as follows:
A key of a function sampled from G n is a pair hs; ri, where s is a key of a function f s sampled from F n and r 2 U`( n) . For every input x 2 I n the value of g s;r on x is de ned by g s;r (x) def = f s (x) r We still need to handle the fact that the distinguisher gets g s;r (x) on inputs x of its choice and that this choice might depend on r. However, in this case the dependence on r is only through values g s;r (y) that were previously queried by the distinguisher. It turns out that such a dependence is not as fatal. We rst de ne an e cient oracle machine A such that on input r 2 U`( n) and access to a function f s sampled from F n operates as follows: A rst chooses an input x 2 I n which only depends on its internal coin-tosses. I.e., x is independent of r. After making at mostueries to f s which are all di erent from x it outputs a guess for f s (x) r which is correct with probability at least 1=2 + =q.
Note that for at least =2q fraction of the choices for the internal coin-tosses of A the probability that it succeeds in guessing f s (x) r is at least 1=2 + =2q. Therefore, we can now apply the Goldreich-Levin-Racko reconstruction algorithm 1 to get an e cient oracle machine D such that on input 1 n and access to a function f s sampled from F n operates as follows: D rst chooses an input x 2 I n . After making O(`(n) (q= ) 2 q) queries to f s which are all di erent from x it outputs a guess for f s (x) which is correct with probability (( =q) 2 ). This contradicts the assumption that F is an unpredictable function-ensemble and completes the proof of the theorem. It is immediate that the choice of x is indeed independent of r. Proving the success probability of A (claimed above) is done by a standard hybrid argument.
5 Weaker Notions
In this section we consider weaker notions of indistinguishability and unpredictability then those of De nitions 3.1 and 3.2. We show how to relax either one of these de nitions by allowing the adversary a random attack rather than an adaptive attack. As will be described below, such random attacks come up naturally in applications such as identi cation and encryption. Two meanings in which an attack can be random are: Remark 5.1 An alternative to an adaptive attack and a random attack is a static attack.
In this case, D has to choose and send x 1 ; x 2 ; : : :x q at the rst round. Such an attack seem less natural in the applications we consider here and we therefore ignore it. For some intuition on the di erence between adaptive and static attacks see 20] .
The total number the de nitions we obtain by considering all combinations (i.e., indistinguishability vs. unpredictability, adaptive samples vs. random samples and adaptive challenges vs. random challenges) is eight. Some of these de nitions seems less natural than others. To get a feeling for this, let us consider the actual requirements for the standard authentication, identi cation and encryption schemes:
Matching De nitions with Tasks
A group of parties that share a pseudo-random function f s may perform the following standard schemes (or other more elaborated variants):
Authentication The authentication tag of a message m is de ned to be f s (m).
Here we need unpredictability against an adaptive sample and an adaptive challenge.
Identi cation A member of the group, V, determines if A is also a member by issuing a random challenge r and verifying that the respond of A is f s (r).
Assuming that the adversary can perform an active attack (i.e., can participate in executions of the protocol as the veri er), we need unpredictability against an adaptive sample and a random challenge. If the adversary is limited to a passive attack (i.e., can only eavesdrop to previous executions of the protocol), then we only need unpredictability against a random sample and a random challenge.
Encryption The encryption of a message m is de ned to be hr; f s (r) mi, where r is a uniformly chosen input. Assuming that the adversary is limited to a chosen plain-text attack, then we need indistinguishability against a random sample and a random challenge. If the adversary can perform a chosen cipher-text attack, then we need indistinguishability against an adaptive sample and a random challenge. In fact, here we might want to consider a stronger attack where the adversary queries the function after getting the challenge. Note that this is the only one of the eight de nitions where such an exchange of order adds power to the adversary.
Additional Transformations of Unpredictability to Indistinguishability
In Section 4, we considered the g s;r (x) = f s (x) r construction (Construction 4.1) as a transformation of unpredictable functions to pseudo-random functions. As discussed there, the problem in using a public r in this construction is that it enables the distinguisher to choose inputs for g s;r (x) that directly depend on r. For such an input x, the value g s;r (x) might be distinguishable from random. However, when we consider weaker de nitions of unpredictability and indistinguishability where the challenge is random such a problem does not occur. In this case a rather simple application of the GL-bit gives the following theorem:
Theorem 5.1 Let F = fF n g n2N be an e cient I n 7 ! I`( n) function-ensemble. De ne G = fG n g n2N as in Construction 4.1. It follows that:
1. If F obtains unpredictability against an adaptive sample and a random challenge, then G obtains indistinguishability against an adaptive sample and a random challenge. 2. If F obtains unpredictability against a random sample and a random challenge, then G obtains indistinguishability against a random sample and a random challenge.
Both (1) and (2) hold even if for each function g s;r 2 G n we let r be public
As discussed in Section 5.1, indistinguishability against an adaptive sample and a random challenge is su cient for the standard private-key encryption scheme whereas unpredictability against an adaptive sample and a random challenge is su cient for the standard challenge-response identi cation scheme. Therefore, any function that is designed for the identi cation scheme can be transformed into a private-key encryption scheme. It is true that a single-bit function is not good enough for the encryption scheme. However, as described in the Introduction, getting a larger output length can either be achieved at the cost of a decrease in security or by concatenating several functions.
Improving E ciency for Weaker De nitions
Identifying the exact requirements for any given protocol (as done in Section 5.1 for the authentication, identi cation and encryption schemes) might be used for getting more ecient implementations of this protocol. We demonstrate this here by showing a more e cient variant for one of the constructions of 21] that is su cient for the standard identi cation scheme.
In 21], Naor and Reingold present two related constructions of pseudo-random functions. The construction that is based on factoring gives a single-bit (or few-bits) pseudorandom function. We show that if we are only interested in unpredictability against an adaptive sample and a random challenge this construction can be improved.
Informally, their construction of pseudo-random functions that are at least as secure as factoring is as follows: Let N be distributed over Blum-integers (N = P Q, where P and Q are primes and P = Q = 3 mod 4) and assume that (under this distribution) it is hard to factor N. Let g be a uniformly distributed quadratic residue in Z N , let a = ha 1;0 ; a 1;1 ; a 2;0 ; a 2;1 ; : : :a n;0 ; a n;1 i be a uniformly distributed sequence of a i;x i mod N As described in Section 5.1, such a function can be used for the standard challengeresponse identi cation scheme.
